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Afterlife – Who Takes Heart for Restart? 
Non-technical summary 
The topic of entrepreneurship research slightly changes from the firm-view to the 
individual level, i.e. the focus shifts increasingly to the entrepreneur behind the firm 
as the object of investigation. In the course of this, it became apparent that a large 
section of the entrepreneurial activity is attributable to habitual entrepreneurs and 
therefore to individuals establishing more than once. These serial- or portfolio-
entrepreneurs have entrepreneurial experience that helps them to perform better on 
average than inexperienced entrepreneurs. However, entrepreneurial experience 
often goes to waste since starting anew is rarely the first option if one has already 
failed with a firm. 
The approach in this paper is to identify the key factors characterizing entrepreneurs 
who failed with a business (i.e. went bankrupt) but started anew after the set-back 
(so called ‘restarters’). Two main hypotheses are tested: firstly, is restart probability 
increased by the length of entrepreneurial experience? Secondly, does the financial 
affliction of failure prevail in the case of a restart? Moreover, a set of explanatory 
variables comprising the personal, entrepreneurial, and regional level is applied. 
The analysis is based on the ZEW Foundation Panel. The panel relies on informa-
tion supplied by Creditreform, the largest German credit rating agency. Getting 
provided with the data on a half-yearly cycle, the ZEW was able to build up this 
panel encompassing foundations since 1990. For the purpose of investigating entre-
preneurs rather than firms this dataset is used for the very first time and is therefore 
new. 
The results found in this paper clearly indicate that there are key factors characteriz-
ing entrepreneurs who fail but then start anew. With respect to the formulated main 
hypotheses the results are ambiguous. No evidence is obtainable in favor of a more 
likely restart with increasing time previously spent in entrepreneurship. By contrast, 
the negative debt dependence of restart is confirmed. Moreover, there are further 
findings: for instance, men are more likely to restart than women, as are entrepre-
neurs with university degree; the entrepreneur’s age affects the restart probability 
negatively. Testing for industry affiliation reveals significant evidence that restart 
likelihood is promoted by several industries. 
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Abstract 
The performance of young and newly founded firms de-
pends largely to the human capital of the firm owner. The 
entrepreneur is therefore one of the main success factors for 
the firm. Yet entrepreneurs differ considerably in their 
background and characteristics. Particularly, founders’ in-
dividual entrepreneurial experience is a property that might 
be crucial for firm development, though it is part of the 
firm’s human capital, too. Business failures, namely bank-
ruptcies, may trigger the transition from being a novice en-
trepreneur to becoming an entrepreneur who is entrepreneu-
rially experienced. About 3 percent of novice entrepreneurs 
who file for bankruptcy reestablish afterwards. On average, 
slightly more than 15 months will elapse until such ‘fallen’ 
entrepreneurs venture out anew. They differ from entrepre-
neurs not willing or able to take a second chance in several 
respects. 
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Introduction 
The approach in this paper is to identify the key factors characterizing entrepreneurs 
who failed with a business but started anew after the set-back (so called ‘re-
starters’). Such a specification “allows us to make better predictions […] about the 
likely behavior, responses, and success of the entrepreneur” (Woo et al., 1991, p. 
93). The business failures covered by the cases we consider are all bankruptcies, 
that is, the state of insolvency is a legal finding. Voluntary firm exits are often due 
to economic reasons, too, and, therefore, may also count among business failures. 
The restriction to bankruptcies, thus, is a limitation of the analysis but is neverthe-
less reasonable. In 1999 a new insolvency law was introduced in Germany. This 
reform took place in order to standardize the rules valid in West- and East-Germany 
and to correct several limitations of the previous statutes which were more than 120 
years old and which had thus become inappropriate. The new rules facilitate that 
going bankrupt does not necessarily mean the end of an entrepreneurial career. Due 
to a 30-year liability for private debts this was previously the custom. Failed free-
lancers, craftsmen and sole proprietors are now able to establish a new business 
unmortgaged by debts. The discharge procedure enables debt relief after a mini-
mum of six years ‘on probation’ (in German: ‘Wohlverhaltensperiode’) even if not 
the whole sum or only a minimum debt quota has been paid back within this period 
(Trendelenburg, 2000).1 That is, the “debtor is under the obligation to work or at 
least to take pains to get a job in order to hand over a great part of what is earned to 
its creditors. A number of further co-operation duties exist in this period which are 
sanctioned by the denial of discharge in case of misbehaving” (Paulus, forthcom-
ing). Having the prospect of debt relief after filing for insolvency was an adjustment 
towards a more debtor friendly system. This specific reform issue was based on the 
assumption that the abandonment of entrepreneurial careers after bankruptcy was 
mainly caused by the burden of debt. In reality, however, we cannot be certain of 
this. As yet, there has been no investigation into what determines a restart. The re-
search question of “who takes heart for restart” is therefore important to work this 
point out. Was the ‘remaining debt’ assumption founded or is the restart decision 
based on other, perhaps more important, factors. It is reasonable in theory that, apart 
from indebtedness, there are several determinants which lastingly affect the restart 
decision. In this regard the human-capital-theory plays a role as well as the princi-
pal/agent theory and the evolutionary theory. Last but not least, a country’s entre-
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preneurial culture is also an essential influencing factor for (ex-)entrepreneurs. The 
intention behind facilitating restarts might have resulted from studies considering 
habitual entrepreneurship. Some of them claim that previous entrepreneurial experi-
ence affects firm success positively. That is, experienced entrepreneurs shine with 
both higher growth and survival of their firms. Additionally, indications exist that 
the very experience of business failure fosters the employment and turnover growth 
of subsequent firms and, therefore, restarts. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 contains a brief dis-
cussion of the theoretical foundation. In Section 2 the literature drawn up to that 
topic previously is reviewed, while Section 3 introduces the applied data and meth-
odology. Descriptive statistics and the estimation results are commented in Section 
4 before Section 5 closes the article with some summarizing conclusions. 
1 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses  
Entrepreneurs who suffered a business failure have to weigh up the individual, so-
cial, and economic factors of their restart decision, maybe arriving at the conclusion 
that they should leave the entrepreneurial career path (Dyer, 1994). The exit deci-
sion might be suggested by understanding their failure as a signal that they would 
be better off abandoning all entrepreneurial purposes. This view is supported by the 
Darwinian evolutionary theory advocating a ‘survival-of-the-fittest’- respectively 
‘natural selection’-thesis: firms disappear since the market rejects businesses or 
even business ideas, showing that the managers’ entrepreneurial competence was 
not good enough to succeed in competition (Penrose, 1952). Therefore, many ex-
entrepreneurs returned to employee status after having had to close their firms 
(Ronstadt, 1986). Unfortunately, from the applied sample it is only apparent 
whether a restart took place or not. Therefore, it is not obvious if there was an at-
tempt to start anew which was foiled by something or someone. That is, it cannot be 
proved if ex-entrepreneurs abandoned their entrepreneurial career voluntarily due to 
the loss of confidence in their entrepreneurial capabilities. However, very often it is 
not clear if the firm failure was due to entrepreneurial incompetence or due to ex-
ternal effects which cannot be influenced by the concerned entrepreneurs. The real-
ity of imperfect markets allows for several such causes, for example, the appearance 
of strong competitors dominating the market, plagiarism or behavior modification 
of state regulation. Imperfections, thus, limit the survival-of-the-fittest-doctrine. 
                                                                                                                                     
1  If the insolvency court admits the debtor’s plea for discharge (in German: ‘Restschuldbefreiung’), 
the period of good behavior begins retroactively with the bankruptcy proceeding’s opening. 
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Ronstadt, 1982, notes that a lot entrepreneurs were at first engaged in several 
(failed) businesses before they got involved in a successful one. This approach is 
comprehensible under the ‘human capital’-theory: it suggests that investments in 
skills through formal educational attainment, training-on-the-job or professional 
experience increase one’s performance (Mincer, 1974; Becker, 1985). Entrepreneu-
rial experience includes training-on-the-job as well as professional experience. 
These enhance the entrepreneur’s human capital. And, the longer the experience 
took to acquire, the higher the investment is. Since the prospect of increased per-
formance should heighten one’s motivation to restart, the first and main hypothesis 
of this paper can be put forward as follows: 
H1: Restart probability increases in conjunction with human-
capital enhancing education or training and, therefore, also with 
the time previously spent in entrepreneurship. 
Leaving the entrepreneurial career path after business failure is similar to depreciat-
ing specific human capital. The question is why a large number of entrepreneurs do 
depreciate their knowledge and reject restart. An answer might be derived by the 
‘principal/agent’-theory. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) The restart decision is not 
exclusively a decision by the failed entrepreneurs who are agents in this context. 
Several principals, for example loan officers, are involved in the process, too. 
Asymmetric information disadvantages these principals, that is, they cannot be sure 
about the failed entrepreneurs’ real intentions. Thus, they need to be convinced that 
the restart is promising and well thought-out. Theory suggests doing that by meas-
ures of signaling. That is, one has to set the principals a good example, maybe by 
getting additional financiers (e.g. family and friends) on board. Usually, financial 
backers screen the credit applicants’ backgrounds to shed light upon their inten-
tions. In the special case of restarters – to their regret – the two very striking factors 
which immediately attract the principals’ attention are the applicant’s previous 
business failure, superficially indicating their incompetence (see above), as well as 
the debt resulting from the failure. These items make it more difficult for the entre-
preneur to convince the principals of the opposite, and in the case of credit granting 
it makes the credit rating worse, which in turn makes borrowing dearer. Especially 
when the new capital requirements directive for credit institutions and investment 
firms (Basel II) is in policy execution one might get conscious of the new insol-
vency law’s discharge rules’ importance. Nevertheless, it is economically rational to 
put hard facts such as a former business failure and the resulting debt from it into a 
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rating very quickly. Thus, the second hypothesis can be put forward in the follow-
ing way: 
H2: Restart probability decreases reciprocally to the level of debt 
(resulting from business failure). 
Nevertheless, the weight with which both business failure and debt are introduced 
into the rating is not definite. Each credit institute or credit rating agency varies in 
dealing with the evaluation. Weighting differences, however, result not only from 
the banking system, but also from a country’s entrepreneurial culture, that is, how it 
deals with its entrepreneurs. In the U.S., for example, self-employment2 is appreci-
ated as a signal of willingness to bear risks. Failures are all part of it being tolerated 
by the system and by society. German society, for example, behaves contrarily to 
that: low risk-taking attitudes prevail. Failures are not as tolerated as in Anglo-
Saxon systems so that some even talk about stigmatization of failure. Therefore, to 
fail with a business is likely to weigh more heavily in rating models – the worst 
result of which would be a refusal of credit. 
2 Related Literature 
One of the other analyses known to follow a similar argumentation was conducted 
by Wagner, 2003. By seeking determinants of “Who takes the second chance?” in 
Germany he investigated in which respect formerly failed entrepreneurs trying to 
restart differ from those leaving their entrepreneurial career path. He relies on sur-
vey data, namely on information from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM), which is an international survey among the population of the participating 
countries. As all survey data results, this poll’s findings rest, of course, on the as-
sumption that the answers provided by the interviewees are reliable. In Wagner’s 
work the ‘self-assessment bias’ concerns the issue of whether they had in the past 
‘closed or given up’ a firm. If they answer in the affirmative there is, unfortunately, 
no way to check whether the former firm went bankrupt or was closed due to finan-
cial distress. Therefore, it cannot be definitely clarified if the firm closure actually 
was a firm failure in the sense defined herein. Nevertheless, Wagner found that es-
pecially younger individuals and the higher educated alike take the second chance. 
They are, in addition, comparatively less risk averse and have rather more contact 
with other start-up entrepreneurs.  
                                                 
2  The term ‘self-employment experience’ is often used synonymously with ‘entrepreneurial experi-
ence’. It is beyond doubt that this is not precisely the same, for example in the case of a freelancer. 
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Besides Wagner’s analysis there is no other research that explicitly tackles the de-
terminants of restarters. Several studies (for example Westhead and Wright, 
1998a;1998b, Westhead and Wright, 1999, Westhead et al., 2005) take serial-
entrepreneurs into account. These serial-entrepreneurs show, however, similarities 
to the restarters in Wagner’s definition, since they have also ‘closed or given up’ a 
firm previously for sure. But, Westhead and Wright consider serial-entrepreneurs’ 
determinants compared to novice entrepreneurs. This is in contrast to Wagner 
whose comparison group consists of ex-novice entrepreneurs, have already turned 
their backs on entrepreneurship. Westhead and Wright, 1998a;1998b, apply data 
from a pencil-based survey among independent new and small businesses in Great 
Britain performed in late 1990 and early 1991. With regard to the family back-
ground they found that novices are more often from underprivileged classes of soci-
ety; the share of entrepreneurs whose parents were unskilled employees was more 
than twice as much in case of novice entrepreneurs. The working life is more turbu-
lent in case of serial entrepreneurs since they have a higher number of organizations 
they worked for prior to the job in the surveyed firm. Respectively to the reasons 
leading to start-up several significant deviations occur, even though the levels differ 
by a range of 7 to 12 percentage-points only. Serial-entrepreneurs agree with the 
statements ‘follow role models’ and ‘need for personal development’ to a higher 
extent than novices. Contrarily, the latter are more prone to agree to causes like 
‘need for independence’ and ‘welfare considerations’. In the case of serial-
entrepreneurs, the start-up’s sourcing is more likely based on personal savings and 
on capital of family and friends. 
Westhead et al., 2005, base their results on a representative sample of private firms 
in Scotland. They found that serial entrepreneurs are more innovative than novice 
entrepreneurs. A higher share of the former group affiliates give an affirmative an-
swer to each of the questions of whether they introduced both product and process 
innovations. This is maybe due to the brainstorming process with respect to the 
business idea. Compared to novices, serial entrepreneurs would rather describe the 
business idea as issue of an ‘accidental process’ than as a planed result. 
3 Data and Methodology 
Database 
For the analysis of the entrepreneurs’ restart decision and its determinants, the ZEW 
Foundation Panel (see Almus et al., 2000, for details)  is employed. The panel relies 
on information provided by Creditreform, the largest German credit rating agency. 
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The data contains not only general information about newly founded firms in Ger-
many but also details about individuals whose entrepreneurial activities have been 
observed longitudinally. Firm-specific business failure information along with data 
about the firm owners allow the identification of those persons who reestablish after 
business failures. The ZEW Foundation Panel currently contains information on 
more than 4 million German firms and their founders established after 1989. The 
probability that a bankrupt firm is recorded in the data is nearly one hundred per-
cent. Therewith, the ZEW Foundation Panel provides a representative database for 
restart analysis in Germany. 
Definitions 
As explained above, a business failure is defined as bankruptcy. “It is widely per-
ceived that all exits from self-employment are failures, but is this necessarily the 
case?” (Taylor, 1999, p. 144) Actually, the definition of what event is considered a 
business failure is not easily construed. That firm closure and business failure are 
not necessarily identical is shown by the comments of Everett and Watson, 1998. 
They gathered five basic categories of closure: discontinuance of ownership, dis-
continuance of the business, bankruptcy, disposal with losses to prevent further 
losses and inability to ‘make a go of it’. All of these include a different subset of 
closed firms – of course with possible overlaps. Nevertheless, only the last three 
account for business failure. Thus, recent entrepreneurs who ‘closed or gave up’ a 
firm in the past, as Wagner defined restarters, may have had completely different 
reasons for having done so as compared to the ones who suffered a business failure. 
For instance, “organizations [can] differ in their thresholds of performance, and exit 
or survival is determined by whether economic performance falls below or stays 
above that firm-specific thresholds” (Gimeno et al., 1997, p. 751). In consequence, 
such (ex-)entrepreneurs come to the decision to start anew under different precondi-
tions than restarters do. On the other hand one could argue that smart entrepreneurs 
who act with foresight exit the market before they are forced to file for bankruptcy. 
However, due do to data restrictions it is not possible to control for these cases. 
Besides compiling the closure categories, Everett and Watson also especially em-
phasize that in the former literature “generally, the definition of failure used has, to 
a large extent, depended on the nature of the data available” (Everett and Watson, 
1998, p. 374). Consequently, since the ZEW Foundation Panel contains exact status 
information with regard to running bankruptcy proceedings, ‘bankruptcy’ is used as 
the failure event. With this definition it seems to be clear if and when a business 
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failure occurs. Yet the opening of a bankruptcy proceeding may be dismissed for 
different reasons. Hence, it is necessary to delimit the case of bankruptcy rather 
strictly. Bankruptcy, therefore, applies only in the case of regular opening of the 
bankruptcy proceeding, that is, without rejection of the opening request for insuffi-
ciency of assets. 
The accurate definition of the bankruptcy event is important. Kranzusch and 
Günterberg, 2001, argue that dishonest debtors might sap the firm’s capital prior to 
filing for bankruptcy. This causes the opening request’s rejection due to the insuffi-
ciency of assets. Owing to this a closer investigation of the firm’s business activi-
ties, as would be the case in the regularly opened bankruptcy proceeding, is 
avoided.3 In consequence, the delinquent debtors would be able to reestablish free 
of debt. In this way the debt absconders may in some cases even pass through re-
peated cycles of business formation and purposive bankruptcy. To avoid consider-
ing these individuals as legitimate restart entrepreneurs, the definition of the bank-
ruptcy event must be, indeed, restrictive. Unfortunately, owing to the fact that the 
opening requests of many firms in the panel which filed for bankruptcy were re-
jected, most observations are dropped from further analysis. 
In addition, the chronology of events revolving around business formation and 
bankruptcy is considered for case selection as well. In many of the recorded obser-
vations with a multi-firm entrepreneurial biography, firm-closure and restart overlap 
with one another, i.e., the restart’s founding date is earlier than the reported opening 
date of the bankruptcy proceedings. In these cases it is not clearly attributable 
whether they account for a restart or not. One is disposed not to consider such cases 
as restarts as the chronological order indicates so-called portfolio entrepreneurship 
where firms are established parallel to each other. Adequate categorization hinges 
on the closeness of events in founding the second firm and opening the first firm’s 
bankruptcy proceeding. In absence of justifiable assumptions concerning this cate-
gorization issue, it is more practicable to strictly rely on the chronology of events, 
and thus not to count these cases of parallel business formation as restarts. 
Therefore, in summary, a restart entrepreneur is defined as someone who suffers 
bankruptcy as a novice – regardless if she/he was a member of the founding team or 
just joined an existing firm – and launches a new firm (restart) after the opening of 
                                                 
3  The opening request’s rejection due to the insufficiency of assets is indeed sufficient condition for 
an administrative investigation by the insolvency practitioner. Nonetheless, the inquiry is much less in-
depth relative to an inquiry following a regular opening since in the case of rejection the insolvency 
practitioner’s scrutiny will be thwarted by the threat of not getting his money’s worth. 
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the bankruptcy proceeding.4 In the following, these entrepreneurs will be called 
restarters. In the awareness that entrepreneurs joining an existing firm differ from 
entrepreneurs really founding a firm and working in it from the start, I control for 
this effect by applying an appropriate dichotomous variable.5 The related articles 
mentioned above give some clarification on several characteristics of serial entre-
preneurs. However, it is impossible to draw any conclusions regarding the determi-
nants of previously failed entrepreneurs on the basis of this empirical evidence. Ap-
plying the restart definition, a business failure by a subsequent restarter is observed 
in the panel for the first time in 1992. Due to associated data restrictions, observa-
tions where the first bankruptcy was recorded prior to the year 1995 were dropped. 
Altogether, more than five-hundred restart cases are available from the database 
according to the above criteria. These are included in the analysis. 
Variables 
The characterization of restarters is based on three types of data: it relies (1) on the 
individual’s personal information, (2) on information related to their bankrupt firms, 
and (3) on data describing the region of the firms’ location. The values of all the 
variables characterize the state at the time when the first failure symptom in terms 
of the legal bankruptcy proceeding occurs.6 Individual data is introduced since it 
reflects three issues affecting the restart decision: human capital endowment condi-
tioning career alternatives, family status accounting for both social and pecuniary 
commitments to family and, finally, general risk-taking attitude. With this type of 
data, thus, it is possible to test the human-capital-related hypothesis. Firm informa-
tion can be used to control for the role played by the extent of the debt burden as 
well for industry specific behavior. Hence, firm data is applied for testing of the 
second hypothesis. Last but not least, regional conditions are considered relevant. 
Founding conditions have long-lasting effects on a firm’s growth and survival 
(Geroski et al., 2003). Therefore, impacts on the entrepreneur cannot be ruled out 
and indeed are likely. Detailed information on the variables (measurement, empiri-
cal evidence, expected influence and its rationale) is given in Table A 1 (see Ap-
pendix). 
                                                 
4  Only insolvency of the first establishment in the person’s entrepreneurial biography applies. Fur-
thermore, the biography is considered by the time of the first successful firm-foundation (i.e. not ending 
in bankruptcy). 
5  To identify the relevant entrepreneur(s) among all participants involved, we took account of partici-
pation in both equity and management. Only individuals who have shares in equity and work in the 
management simultaneously are considered as relevant. 
6  The first failure symptom is mostly, but not necessarily, filing for insolvency. In other cases it may 
rather be its affirmation or the proceedings’ opening (in the cases the filing hasn’t been registered). 
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The applied set of variables is expandable of course. Effects arising, for example, 
from the entrepreneur’s social capital, from the specificity of her/his skills or from a 
good match between her/his human capital and the applied business model on the 
restart probability are conceivable. But, due to the lack of data, one has to make do 
with the specification as it stands. 
The data preparation results in a gross sample of about 33 thousand failed entrepre-
neurs. Unfortunately, the complete set of variables does not exist for all of the iden-
tified entrepreneurs, so observations had to be deleted on a case-by-case basis.7 In 
order to discard only a minimum number of observations the approach advocated 
by Cohen and Cohen, 1983, is applied to variables with a large number of missing 
values. In this approach, separate dummy variables were generated taking on the 
value one, if the relevant variable shows missing values; in return, the missing val-
ues were coded with zero afterwards. By this approach most observations could be 
maintained, henceforth adding up to nearly 29 thousand individuals.8
Econometric Specification 
To identify the determinants for entrepreneurial restart a binomial Probit estimation 
approach is used. I apply three binomial Probit models, varying the variables and/or 
observations introduced. Model A is the base model which uses all observations. 
The Models B and C were estimated to consider Western and Eastern Germany 
separately. In all three regressions the decision to start anew after a business failure 
is considered to be endogenous and modelled as a binary response. That is, the cri-
terion variable takes on the value one in the case of entrepreneurial restarts after 
filing for bankruptcy and zero otherwise. 
4 Empirical Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Some descriptive statistics summarizing the investigated groups are provided in 
Table 1. Restarters account for a little less than 3 percent of the entrepreneurs who 
filed for bankruptcy. That is substantially lower than the share that Wagner, 2003, 
observed in his survey. In his sample of failed entrepreneurs a restarter-share of 
about 8 percent results. The explanation for this difference draws on the respective 
                                                 
7  The lack of values is not systematic, that is, the omission of observations does not bias the sample. 
8  Jones, 1996, argues that this approach results in biased estimators due to overestimating the residual 
variance which “can weaken the power of a t test that compares two of the nonmissing groups.” But, 
this problem seems to be negligible compared to the information loss of complete-case analysis. 
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definitions of failure: While Wagner asks about firms that have been closed or 
given up which includes voluntary exits, the analysis presented here exclusively 
employs recorded bankruptcy-events. The number of voluntary exits is roughly 
similar to the number of bankruptcies (Prantl, 2003). Thus, there is a high potential 
that respondents assess themselves as restarters in survey data, although they dis-
continued voluntarily. Since an entrepreneur who dropped out voluntarily is more 
likely to restart than a failed entrepreneur – which is rather due to divergence of 
opportunity than of willingness – the measured share is increased. More than 90 
percent of the restarters are male, an average which is 12 percent above that for the 
group of non-restarters. Additionally, they are more than two and a half years 
younger than the non-restarters who average 45 years of age, are more academically 
educated, are rarely married, and raise children slightly less often. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
All Failed 
Entrepreneurs 
Non- 
Restarters Restarters Variables 
Mean SD # ofObs.(2) Mean SD 
# of
Obs.(2) Mean SD 
# of 
Obs.(2)
Significance
Level(1)
           
% Restarter 0.03 0.00 1.00    
     
Gender (% male) 0.80 0.40 0.79 0.41 0.91 0.29  *** 
Age 44.76 26,819 44.84 26,063 42.22  756 *** 
Education     
 % Academics 0.29 26,582 0.29 25,826 0.37  756 *** 
 % Master Craftsmen 0.16 17,836 0.16 17,258 0.12  578 *** 
Family Status     
 % Have Children 0.22 17,836 0.22 17,258 0.19  578 * 
 % Married 0.88 16,588 0.88 16,116 0.84  472 ** 
     
Firm Size (# of employees) 17.63 43.76 22,827 17.48 43.60 22,127 22.44 48.48 700 *** 
Legal Form (% limited liability) 0.67 0.66 0.92   *** 
Corporate Real Property (% yes) 0.23 0.24 0.14   *** 
Founder Member (% yes) 0.29 0.29 0.33   *** 
Team (% multi-owner firms) 0.32 0.32 0.44   *** 
Time Spent in Previous Firm 3.69 3.32 3.71 3.34 3.22 2.30  *** 
     
Rate of Unemployment in the Region 12.44 5.18 12.47 5.19 11.47 4.87  *** 
Foundation Intensity in the Region 45.67 11.94 45.61 11.92 47.62 12.65  *** 
Business Failure Intensity in the Region 7.63 2.92 7.65 2.92 7.05 2.73  *** 
Region Type (% metropolitan districts) 0.46 0.46 0.59   *** 
     
Number of Observations 28,965 28,193   772  
(1) Significance level on performing a t-test on mean differences (Non-restarters vs. Restarters) 
 (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
(2) Number of observations is reduced in the case of missing values. 
Source: ZEW Foundation Panel. 
When restarters went bankrupt for the first time they employed an average of 22 
employees, five more than other failed firms. Also, compared to non-restarters, they 
ran their business from their own firm premises just under half as frequently, at the 
point of bankruptcy. Status as a founder member is slightly more prevalent in the 
restarter group, and about 12 percentage points more restarters were part of multi-
owner firms, possibly related to the higher share of limited liability enterprises at 92 
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percent. Their average length of participation in the failure firm is a half year 
shorter than that of non-restarters. Restarters and non-restarters set up their failed 
firms in regions which differ in all regional indicators considerably. Regions in 
which restarters were located show decreased unemployment rate, increased foun-
dation intensity, lower business failure intensity and are up to 10 percentage-points 
more often metropolitan areas. 
Another interesting structural fact is the distribution of the entrepreneurship inter-
ruption length, i.e., the duration that restarters remain entrepreneurially inactive 
after the business failure. As Figure 1 shows it is a right skewed distribution. On 
average, 15 months elapse before a failed entrepreneur realizes her/his restart. In 50 
percent of cases, overall, a restarter does not take the second chance until 7 months 
have passed since the bankruptcy proceeding’s opening. In terms of peak frequen-
cies, restarters appear not to waste a lot of time and start their new ventures directly 
after the bankruptcy, that is, within the first 4 months. Such a closure/restart-
behavior may be related to several reasons, but first of all it seems to be strategi-
cally induced, for example in terms of dealing with mounting debt. In the face of 
conceivably unaffordable liabilities, one may seek to overcome through advancing 
plans for new ventures. By the time bankruptcy hits, one is, thus, prepared for an 
early restart. But by no means all restarts are strategically motivated; an early restart 
is also possible due to the commitment to a business idea, and if the first attempt 
fails the second comes directly to the fore. 
Figure 1: Distribution of the Entrepreneurship Interruption Length 
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Note: The outlined curve traces the distribution’s  
kernel density function. The number of cases is 772. 
Source: ZEW Foundation Panel. 
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Nevertheless, the large number of restarts in the first 4 months after failure indeed 
suggests that these restarts are calculated in relation to the avoidance of warranties 
or obligations. The consideration of the sample’s industry distribution in Table 2 
may help to underpin that most restarters, however, haven’t been sailing (too) close 
to the wind. 
The structure reveals that 50 percent of all bankruptcies occur in construction and 
trade services – an equal share in each – and another fifth in consumer services. The 
remainder is shared by manufacturing, company related services, and other sectors 
at similar percentages. The industry distribution for non-restarters differs mainly in 
two respects: the share of manufacturing is distinctly larger and the share of con-
sumer services clearly smaller than in case of all bankruptcies. That might be owing 
to the transition counting individuals instead of firm entities, which can however 
not be verified here. Restarters differ in three items from the industry structure of 
non-restarters and, what is more, in virtually every industry compared to all bank-
ruptcies. The relative number of failures in consumer services and trade services are 
lower than in the case of non-restarters, in contrast to a much higher share in com-
pany related services. As regards the hypothesis of warranty or obligation avoidance 
this distribution is contradictory: significantly larger shares of restarters in industries 
with on average high obligations or long-term warranties – such as manufacturing 
and construction – should rather be a point in favor of the above supposition, but 
not just slightly higher shares. There is also the fact that merely 37 to 56 percent of 
the entrepreneurs continue in the same industry in which they were engaged with 
their 1st firms when they establish again (within industry restarts). Supposing that 
the first market entry is caused to a large extent by entrepreneurs’ skills, it is plausi-
ble, to assume that those who just want to evade commitments are more likely to 
restart within the same industry than the others. But, at around 50 percent within-
industry-restart shares are not sufficient to support such a conclusion, particularly 
since it can be maintained that entrepreneurs will again want to build on their skills, 
with or without criminal intent. On the other hand the business-cycle-theory gives a 
rationale for changing sectors for a restart. If there are bad economic conditions in 
an industry the number of sector-specific bankruptcies will increase. An entrepre-
neur who wants to restart then would do better either to wait a while before restart-
ing in the same industry, or change his/her sector affiliation to start anew. This busi-
ness-cycle-hypothesis is partly supported by the descriptive statistics. The share of 
restarters who have experience within their industry increases with the time that has 
passed since bankruptcy: it rises from 42 percent in the case of restart in the first 12 
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months, up to 58 percent if up to 6 years have passed since bankruptcy. Afterwards 
the share varies unsystematically. 
Table 2: Industry Structure 
 Restarters 
Industry Bankruptcies(1995-2004) 
Non-Restarters
(initial failure) (1) 1
st Firm 
(initial failure) 
(2) 2nd Firm 
(restart) 
Within
Industry
Restarts
Manufacturing 11.6% 16,2% ** 18.8% *** 14.0% 41.4% 
 Including:  Technology-Intensive Manufacturing 2.0% 4,1%  3.5%  3.4% 22.2% 
Company Related Services 12.1% 11,9% *** 20.9%  22.7% 46.6% 
 Including:  Technology-Related Services 4.8% 5,2% *** 11.5%  10.7% 30.3% 
  Non-Technical Consulting Services 3.2% 2,7% *** 5.4% ** 8.1% 40.5% 
Consumer Services 18.6% 13,4% *** 9.1% *** 13.6% 37.1% 
Construction 24.7% 26,7%  25.5% *** 20.3% 55.8% 
Trade Services 24.7% 24,0% ** 20.6%  20.9% 51.6% 
Other Sectors 8.1% 7,7% *** 5.2% *** 8.6% 45.0% 
All Industries 100% 100%  100%  100% 48.1% 
Number of Observations 302,672 28,193  772  700(3)  
(1) Significance level on performing a t-test on mean differences (Non-restarters vs. Restarters) 
(2) Significance level on performing a t-test on mean differences (1st vs. 2nd firm of restarters) 
 (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%) 
(3) 72 missing values 
Source: ZEW Foundation Panel. 
From the event of restarts emerges an industry structure different from the one 
known among initial establishments that fail. The resulting distribution is relatively 
symmetric: three industries (company related services, trade services and construc-
tion) account for roughly 20 percent each, whereas both manufacturing and con-
sumer services level off more or less at 14 percent. Overall, compared to the initial 
industry composition four significant differences occur. While consumer services 
and residual sectors exhibit raised proportions, the shares of manufacturing and 
construction each decrease. 
Estimation Results 
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the binomial Probit estimates for determi-
nants of restarters. In the second column, the resulting coefficients of Model A, 
which is the base model, are depicted. The thoughts on the first hypothesis related 
with the human-capital-theory, that ‘restart probability increases in conjunction  
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Table 3: Coefficients on Binomial Probit Estimates for Determinants of Restarters 
Explanatory Variables Model A Base Model 
Model B 
Western Germany
Model C 
Eastern Germany 
0.295 *** 0.329 *** 0.233 ** Gender (male) 
(0.054)  (0.066)  (0.095)  
-0.599 *** -0.612 *** -0.567 *** Age (log) (0.080)  (0.098)  (0.146)  
Education     
0.100 ** 0.116 ** 0.086   Formal (academics) (0.045)  (0.059)  (0.074)  
-0.030  -0.052  0.010   Vocational (master craftsmen) (0.061)  (0.080)  (0.099)  
Family Status     
-0.018  -0.005  -0.031   Having Children (0.057)  (0.070)  (0.099)  
0.011  0.016  -0.025   Marital Status (married) (0.063)  (0.073)  (0.124)  
0.064 *** 0.045 ** 0.110 *** Firm Size (# of employees; log) 
(0.015)  (0.018)  (0.028)  
0.549 *** 0.638 *** 0.323 *** Legal Form (liability limited) (0.058)  (0.069)  (0.108)  
-0.123 ** -0.014  -0.246 *** Corporation Real Estate (0.050)  (0.069)  (0.075)  
0.025  -0.002  0.074  Founder Member (0.038)  (0.045)  (0.074)  
0.151 *** 0.142 *** 0.192 *** Entrepreneurial Team (0.035)  (0.043)  (0.061)  
-0.011  0.007  -0.045  Length of Participation (log) (0.025)  (0.030)  (0.045)  
Industry     
0.038  -0.028  0.404   Technology-Intensive Manufacturing (0.110)  (0.132)  (0.250)  
0.213 ** 0.095  0.685 ***  Remaining Manufacturing (0.083)  (0.094)  (0.219)  
0.278 *** 0.180 * 0.707 ***  Technology-Related Services (0.090)  (0.101)  (0.229)  
0.363 *** 0.343 *** 0.401   Non-Technical Consulting Services (0.104)  (0.112)  (0.308)  
0.111  0.057  0.469 *  Remaining Company-Related Services (0.107)  (0.120)  (0.267)  
0.081  0.025  0.406 *  Consumer Services (0.087)  (0.098)  (0.228)  
0.089  0.004  0.471 **  Construction (0.078)  (0.089)  (0.212)  
0.113  0.072  0.404 *  Trade Services (0.078)  (0.085)  (0.219)  
-0.163  -0.143  -0.833 ** Rate of Unemployment in the Region (log) 
(0.115)  (0.132)  (0.348)  
0.066  0.099  -0.164  Foundation Intensity in the Region (log) (0.134)  (0.146)  (0.391)  
-0.063  -0.005  -0.216  Failure Intensity in the Region (log) (0.129)  (0.157)  (0.277)  
0.079 * 0.037  0.153 * Region Type (metropolitan district) (0.043)  (0.051)  (0.081)  
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Table 3: Coefficients on Binomial Probit Estimates for Determinants of Restarters, (continued) 
Explanatory Variables Model A Base Model 
Model B 
Western Germany 
Model C 
Eastern Germany 
Missing Value Measures     
-0.314 *** -0.186  -0.600 ***  Gender is Missing (0.109)  (0.132)  (0.208)  
-2.703 *** -2.771 *** -2.771 ***  Age is Missing (0.313)  (0.377)  (0.588)  
-0.100 ** -0.080  -0.159 *  Education is Missing (0.045)  (0.052)  (0.092)  
-0.035  -0.017  -0.095   Having Children is Missing (0.041)  (0.048)  (0.081)  
-0.179 *** -0.136 * -0.291 **  Marital Status is Missing (0.063)  (0.075)  (0.122)  
-0.035  -0.022  -0.085   Firm Size is Missing (0.062)  (0.071)  (0.135)  
-0.290  -0.451  2.855  Constant (0.625)  (0.708)  (1.946)  
Number of Observations 28,965 18,033 10,932 
LR-Test χ2 on Joint Significance of        
 the Industry Measures 25.68 *** 16.56 ** 20.79 *** 
 the Region-Describing Variables 6.41  3.19  9.87 ** 
 the Federal States Dummies (not reported) 48.44 *** 5.22  19.97 *** 
 the Failure Year Dummies (not reported) 7.39  12.15  10.75  
LR Chi2 750.64 459.94 332.90 
Pseudo-R2 0.105 0.097 0.140 
McKelvey and Zavoina's R2 0.212 0.199 0.266 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Note: Veall and Zimmermann, 1996, argue that the McKelvey and  
Zavoina's R2 is most similar to the OLS-R2 and therefore scores best. 
with the time spent in entrepreneurship previously’ cannot be confirmed. There is 
no significant effect resulting from the entrepreneurial experience’s length. Inter-
preting its coefficient sign nevertheless, a negative effect from the participation 
length is to be ascertained. But where does it come from? Independent of her/his 
human-capital a first work entrepreneur is usually very enthusiastic with respect to 
her/his business idea or even to the self-employment status at all. Especially if the 
business fails rapidly this enthusiasm lasts, and might result in an advanced willing-
ness, and therefore realization, to establish anew. Although the competition inten-
sity as a certain determinant of the participation length differs between industries 
the average length in entrepreneurship is very similar across them. Thus, the effect 
of the time spent in entrepreneurship is independent from industry affiliation. Al-
though formal education increases human capital, too, its state is negligible regard-
ing the human capital thesis. In most cases the formal education already exists be-
fore the entrepreneurial career begins. Therewith, it does not reinforce human capi-
tal during the first entrepreneurial phase and thus cannot be considered as a ‘specific 
investment’ (provided that the formal education was not entrepreneurship-related, a 
possibility which is not observable in the data). However, a significantly positive 
effect comes from academic education. Failed entrepreneurs who have a university 
degree, thus, are more likely to restart than others. Nevertheless, a university degree 
does not control for the availability of specialized knowledge (for example man-
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agement or business skills) which might be helpful for handling business failure and 
which may have been gained from attending university. Therefore, this measure 
maps not just academic education itself but rather other skills and values imparted 
by an academic environment that foster the willingness to restart. On all accounts, 
despite a decreasing share of academics in serial entrepreneurs overall (Westhead 
and Wright, 1998a), a university degree plays an important role in terms of reestab-
lishing post-bankruptcy. Master craftsmen show no significantly differing behavior. 
‘Master craftsman’ is a German-specific craftsmen title. To attain the master 
craftsmen diploma, candidates must first complete an apprenticeship and then gain 
some working experience in the respective sector afterwards. Given these precondi-
tions, the diploma can absolutely be seen as measure for specific technical skills. Its 
insignificance is surprising, since it is also a specific investment into entrepreneur-
ship: the crafts sector has been highly regulated, that is, the diploma was a neces-
sary condition for establishing. Hence, this entry barrier should actually increase 
restart probability, even in conjunction with the human capital thesis. 
By contrast more evidence is given in regard to the second hypothesis. Actually, 
there are several variables which support that ‘restart probability decreases recip-
rocal to the level of debt’ resulting from business failure. Firstly, the likelihood of a 
restart is significantly heightened if the business failure occurred with limited liabil-
ity. It restricts potential financial affliction by both the limitation of liability and the 
(at the time of founding irksome) more difficult access to credit at all. Secondly, the 
assumption that the likelihood of restarting depends on financial factors is strength-
ened by the negative effect of corporate real estate proprietary, i.e., the firm owns 
real estate such as developed sites. Financing corporate real property like working 
or administration premises needs a large stake of capital, to which end lenders often 
demand private collateral, e.g. guaranties. Thus, even in the case of limited liability 
legal forms entrepreneurs are nevertheless fully liable. Due to this, real property 
indicates exceeding (private) debts lowering restart probability by downgrading 
creditworthiness. The case of team-ruled firms is linked with financial considera-
tions, too. But now, the rationale takes hold from both the pro and the con side. 
Team-ruling of a firm accounts for limited, or split, financial affliction, as well as 
the eventuality of excessive debts. Since the estimation indicates a positive effect on 
the restart probability, the ‘pro-side’ impact seems to dominate. 
The remaining results can be summarized as follows. Failed male entrepreneurs are 
more likely to restart as compared to their female counterparts. The popular wisdom 
in research which suggests such gender dependence of entrepreneurship affinity is 
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strengthened therewith: men are not only more likely to become self-employed but 
also restart more often in the case of failure. A heightened restart probability is 
found for younger persons as the sign of ‘age’ is negative. This finding holds even 
if applying a specification including ‘age’ as quadratic term: then, a more or less 
linear relationship with negative slope results nevertheless. The effects arising from 
family commitments are unambiguous. Neither the existence of children9 nor the 
entrepreneur’s marital status seems to affect the restart realization. Checking for 
possible gender dependence on the impact of the family status by interacting ‘gen-
der’ with the family status dummies also shows no significant effect. Furthermore, 
failed entrepreneurs are more likely to restart the bigger the former firm was. This 
may be caused by the scope of tasks and responsibilities rising with firm size. No 
determining role is played by the experience as a founder member: taking a second 
chance is independent from it. Industry affiliation considered at the aggregated in-
dustry level affects the restart decision significantly. Entrepreneurs who failed in 
non-technology-intensive manufacturing, technology-related services and non-
technical consulting services show significantly increased restart likelihood.10 Re-
gional conditions are of little relevance to restarts. The Model A regression reveals 
no other significant regional variable except the positive impact of the region type – 
even if it is only weakly, i.e. at the 10%-confidence level, significant. Given the 
high number of observations a 5%-confidence level should be reached for analytic 
proof at least. The unreported control variables, namely the federal state and failure 
year dummies, are of ambiguous influence. While it is relevant for restart in which 
federal state the failure took place it makes no difference to the restart behavior 
when the business failure occurs: not only are all of the single failure year dummies 
are insignificant, but the joint significance of the failure year dummies is also re-
jected. As expected this indicates that the insolvency reform does is not yet taking 
effect in the first years after implementation. 
The Models B and C distinguish by the firm’s origin but include the initial set of 
variables in other respects. Therefore, Model B fits the restart indicator on data of 
entrepreneurs settled in Western Germany while Model C applies information on 
entrepreneurs localized in Eastern Germany. Despite the long time since the Ger-
man unification took place, such a distinction makes sense as the difference be-
tween the economic levels of the two German regions is still quite enormous. The 
                                                 
9  Information about the children’s age is not available. Testing for a gender or team foundation de-
pendence of the family state dummies by applying interaction terms of the relevant variables reveals no 
further significant effects. 
10  A Wald-test cannot reject the null hypotheses that the coefficients are equal. 
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two estimations reveal by which region the effects measured in the base Model A 
are induced. Academic education and non-technical consulting services are the only 
two variables which are important in Model A but exclusively significant in the 
regression restricted to Western Germany. In turn, the impact of corporate real es-
tate property and failure in non-technology-intensive manufacturing resulting from 
the initial estimation are only significant in the East German case. Furthermore, 
some effects are valid for the East German specification but were not measured in 
base Model A. These are, firstly, failure in construction and, secondly, the rate of 
unemployment which affects restart probability negatively as in accordance with 
our expectation. Referring to the East German specification the effects of failure in 
non-technology-intensive manufacturing, technology-related services and construc-
tion each are very strong. Performing Wald-tests cannot reject the null hypotheses 
on equality of the coefficients with exception of the case of non-technology-
intensive manufacturing compared to construction. The joint effect of the federal 
states dummies is insignificant in Model B, that is, in the Western states of Ger-
many the location seems to be irrelevant. Additionally, the finding that the year in 
which the business failure occurred plays no role is confirmed. The joint signifi-
cance of the failure year dummies is rejected in both regional specifications. 
5 Conclusions and Preview 
In order to tap the potential of firm formation by experienced entrepreneurs, it is 
useful to reduce restart obstacles. This requires gaining a detailed picture of the po-
tential target group, i.e. taking a closer look at the characteristics of failed entrepre-
neurs and at (possible) key determinants of restarters. The results found in this pa-
per clearly indicate that there are key factors characterizing entrepreneurs who 
failed but start anew. Restart probability depends on several factors which differ – 
perhaps not exclusively – on personal, entrepreneurial, and regional levels. Am-
biguously are the results with respect to the hypotheses prepared: no evidence is 
obtainable in favor of the idea that restart is more likely with increasing time previ-
ously spent in entrepreneurship. By contrast, the negative debt dependence of restart 
is confirmed. Therewith, an indication supporting the ‘remaining debt’-assumption, 
which was basically for getting the insolvency law reform off the ground, is found. 
Moreover, there are further findings which are widely as expected yet, surprisingly, 
family status ultimately plays no role for the likelihood to restart. Actually one 
could expect that it does due to financial reasons, for example because the uncer-
tainty of returns from a firm founded does not guarantee the continuous income 
needed for large household upkeep. However, financial matters seem to be the 
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dominant influencing factor affecting restart likelihood even if not in the case of 
family status. Several of the determinants referring to the firm-level are associated 
with the financial background: the legal form as an indicator of personal liability, 
corporate real estate as a measure of indirect private borrowing or team entrepre-
neurship as a dimension of potential individual affliction. They all point to a strong 
dependence of the restart decision on financial means. Also quite unexpected is that 
the rate of unemployment approximating the availability of alternative job opportu-
nities is irrelevant for risking the second chance, at least in West Germany. 
The analysis shows, therefore, that this in-depth investigation of previous findings 
is generally needed. Firstly, applying another database containing administratively 
valid information yields confirmatory results regarding some effects indicated by 
survey data analysis. Nevertheless, not all findings are robust enough for generali-
zation and have to be put into perspective. Secondly, employing additive firm-
related variables accommodates unexpected insights in their relevance for decision-
making, for example the meaningfulness of former team-work or industry affilia-
tion. 
However, only 3 percent of failed entrepreneurs make another attempt to establish. 
This is less than half of the share of self-employed individuals in the working age 
population. Owing to the insolvency law reform, the time period after 2005 will be 
a very interesting year for further research on the topic of restarters. In this year the 
‘probation’ period matures for the very first time and, therefore, surely prompts the 
first discharged restarters under new legislation.11 For the additional analysis this 
might mean a change in the significance of several variables, especially with regard 
to variables accounting for financial affliction. Furthermore some research is 
planned in order to analyze the success, i.e. performance and/or survival of restarts. 
                                                 
11  A restart during the years on probation is basically possible, but it bears imponderability: at first, it 
must be agreed with the creditors and, secondly, the failure of the business results inevitably in the 
rejection of discharge. 
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7 Appendix 
Table A 1: Variables: expectations and descriptions 
Determinant Empirical Evidence(own expectation) Measurement Rationale 
Gender 
(male) + (+)  
Females are still not as respected in business as males are. 
This ought to hold even more in the case of failure. 
Age -12 (-)  
The desire for founding one’s own firm decreases with age 
(MittelstandsMonitor, 2004), it is plausible to assume this for 
restarters, too. In consequence, failed younger entrepreneurs 
will be more willing to take risks than older ones. 
Formal 
Education + 
By means of the 
highest achieved 
educational attainment. 
Highly educated individuals who suffer bankruptcy gain 
experience which is valuable for other firms raising their 
market value. Thus, they may find suitable employment after 
business closure rather than test a restart. 
Children (-)  
Pe
rs
on
al
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Marriage (-)  
Keeping a spouse and family might reduce risk affinity and 
should affect restart likelihood negatively. 
Firm Size   
The scope of tasks and responsibilities is correlated with the 
size of a firm and, therefore, the larger an entity is, the more 
one can learn. 
Legal Form (+)  
Beneath the lowering of financial afflictions, legal implica-
tions work in favor of a positive effect of limited liability. 
Unlimitedly liable entrepreneurs who suffered insolvency are 
recorded in a defaulter register for three years impeding 
virtually all access to capital during the scheduled term. 
Corporate 
Real Estate (-)  
The existence of corporate real estate is a measure of the 
borrowing ceiling level and, thus, for exceeding debts. 
Location Relevant(1)   
Length of 
Involvement 
in Previous 
Firm 
- (-) 
Specified as duration 
of firm-attendance 
until the initial failure 
symptom occurs as 
registered in the formal 
proceedings. 
Deficiencies in general and financial management skills are to 
be associated with bankruptcies of younger firms; older firm’s 
insolvency is linked with changes in the competitive envi-
ronment (Thornhill and Amit, 2003). This relation should 
similarly hold for entrepreneur‘s firm-attendance (instead of 
for firm-age only). In the case of shorter firm-attendance 
(younger firms), thus, the deficiencies might be compensated 
by the learning effects inherent to self-employment experi-
ence and subsequent insolvency heightening probability for 
restart. 
Founder 
Member (-)  
An entrepreneur might have been more struck by the failure 
than an entrepreneur who was not involved in the foundation, 
because founder members are more overconfident than other 
entrepreneurs (Forbes, 2000). 
Entrepreneu-
rial Team (+/-)  
Team-rule can lower financial afflictions from bankruptcy 
due to the sharing of costs, but .on the other hand it also eases 
borrowing. The effect on restart probability, thus, is ambigu-
ous. 
Industry Relevant  Industries characterized by high competition markets are more likely to put restarters off. 
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Failure Year Relevant(1)   
Rate of 
Unemploy-
ment 
(+/-)  
High unemployment limits entrepreneurs’ chances of finding 
a job and increases, therefore, the probability of taking the 
second chance as an entrepreneur. On the other hand, how-
ever, districts with high unemployment are characterized by 
for example reduced purchasing power, or disputable market 
shares by necessity founders reducing the prospects for new 
firms already from the outset. 
Foundation 
Intensity (+) 
# of firm-foundations 
per 10.000 employable. 
In fact, ‘foundation intensity’ may serve as a measure of the 
entrepreneurial climate in a region, and the better the climate 
is the more likely it is for other attempts to be made. 
Failure 
Intensity Relevant (-) 
# of bankruptcies per 
10.000 employable. Indicates contested or missing/matured markets. R
eg
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Region Type +/- (+) 
Core cities and districts 
with more than 300 
residents per sq. 
kilometer. 
With reference to Wagner (2003) the contact with ‘role 
models’ fosters the realization of restarts, though such per-
sonal contacts are more likely in agglomerations. 
(1)  Relevant but included merely as a control variable. 
(2)   Introduced at the NUTS-2-level (administrative districts; NUTS: Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics established by  
 Eurostat). 
 
                                                 
12  The multiple-ventures-creator to single-venture-creator ratio decreases with entrepreneurs’ age 
(Ronstadt, 1986). 
